Executive Power, Property Rights, And Due Process: A Legal Appraisal Of The FCT Minister’s Demolition Directives In The Wake Of The Abuja Floods – By Charles Ude(Legal Practitioner And Author)

Executive Power, Property Rights, and Due Process: A Legal Appraisal of the FCT Minister’s Demolition Directives in the Wake of the Abuja Floods

By Charles Ude, Esq.
Legal Practitioner and Author

1. Introduction: The Floodwaters as a Catalyst for Legal Scrutiny

The recent flooding that has ravaged parts of Abuja, particularly the high-brow Maitama District, has brought into sharp focus the perennial tension between executive action and the rule of law. Following his inspection of flood-affected areas on 17 August 2026, the Minister of the Federal Capital Territory, Nyesom Wike, ordered the immediate demolition of all structures found to be obstructing designated waterways . The Minister’s directive was unequivocal: “We will demolish all those houses found on the water channel. Some of them are senators. Some of them are big men” . He further declared that “whether there’s election or there’s no election, all those houses will go down” .

While the Minister’s determination to address the man-made factors exacerbating flooding—including construction on waterways, blocked drainage channels, indiscriminate refuse dumping, and the failure to desilt drainage systems—is commendable, it raises fundamental legal questions about the limits of executive power in a constitutional democracy . The flooding, which Wike acknowledged was partly attributable to climate change and unusually heavy rainfall, has exposed the consequences of years of unregulated development along the city’s waterways . Yet, the proper legal response to this crisis must be measured, procedural, and constitutionally compliant. This opinion examines the correct legal position on the Minister’s powers, considering the statutory framework, constitutional safeguards, and judicial authorities that collectively define the boundaries within which such executive action must operate.

2. The Statutory Framework: Powers Conferred and Limitations Imposed

The Nigerian Urban and Regional Planning Act, 1992 (and its applicable provisions in the FCT) provides the primary legal architecture for planning control and enforcement. Sections 60 to 62 of the Act confer upon the relevant planning authority the power to issue enforcement notices and, where necessary, to demolish structures erected in contravention of planning regulations.

Section 60(1) empowers the Authority to serve a notice requiring the owner or occupier to demolish or alter a building where it is satisfied that such building constitutes a danger to life or property, or where it has been constructed without the requisite approval. Section 60(2) provides that upon the expiration of the time specified in the notice, the Authority may itself demolish the building if the owner has failed to comply.

Section 62 further empowers the Authority to demolish a building without prior notice where it is of the opinion that the building is in a “ruinous state” or constitutes an “imminent danger” to human life or adjacent property. These provisions must, however, be read together with Section 80 of the Kaduna State Urban and Regional Planning Law, 2018 (which is analogous to the FCT provisions), requiring the Authority to provide alternative accommodation or compensation to persons likely to be displaced by a demolition order before the demolition is effected .

The law does not contemplate the exercise of such powers as a personal fiat or arbitrary executive directive. The Minister, as the political head of the FCT Administration, exercises delegated statutory functions, not personal prerogatives. His discretion is therefore “fetterable” in the sense that he must exercise it reasonably, fairly, and in accordance with the procedural requirements of the Act. As the Supreme Court held in Council of the University of Ibadan v. Adamolekun (1967) 1 All NLR 213, a public officer vested with statutory discretion must exercise that discretion in accordance with the law and not arbitrarily or capriciously.

3. The Constitutional Safeguards: Sections 36 and 44 of the 1999 Constitution

The constitutional framework imposes critical constraints on the exercise of demolition powers, and any examination of the Minister’s directives must be anchored in these fundamental provisions.

3.1 The Right to Fair Hearing – Section 36(1)

Section 36(1) guarantees the right to a fair hearing, providing that “a person shall be entitled to a fair hearing within a reasonable time by a court or other tribunal established by law.” While this provision primarily concerns judicial proceedings, the courts have consistently interpreted it to require that administrative decisions affecting rights and interests be taken only after affording the affected person an opportunity to be heard.

The Supreme Court, in Garba v. University of Maiduguri (1986) 1 NWLR (Pt. 18) 550, held that the right to fair hearing is not limited to judicial proceedings but extends to administrative proceedings where the rights of an individual are to be determined. Similarly, in Odukwe v. Ogunbiyi (1998) 8 NWLR (Pt. 561) 339, the Court reaffirmed that the audi alteram partem rule—the right to be heard—is a fundamental principle of natural justice that must be observed whenever any person’s rights or interests are adversely affected by administrative action.

3.2 The Right to Property – Section 44(1)

Section 44(1) protects the right to property, providing that “no movable property or any interest in an immovable property shall be taken possession of compulsorily and no right over or interest in any such property shall be acquired compulsorily in any part of Nigeria except in the manner and for the purposes prescribed by law.” This provision does not prohibit the State from interfering with property rights; it insists that any such interference must be prescribed by law and carried out in accordance with legally established procedures.

The interplay between these constitutional provisions and the statutory powers under the Urban and Regional Planning Act is critical. Where the Act prescribes a procedure—including the service of notices, the right of appeal, and the requirement to afford a hearing—any deviation from that procedure may constitute a breach of Section 36(1) and, by extension, Section 44(1). The Supreme Court, in A.G. Bendel State v. Aideyan (1989) 4 NWLR (Pt. 118) 646, held that the right to property can only be compulsorily acquired in accordance with the law, and any acquisition not in compliance with the prescribed procedure is unconstitutional.

4. The Judicial Response: A Consistent Repudiation of Executive Self-Help

The Supreme Court has, in a long line of authorities, emphatically rejected executive self-help as an acceptable mode of governmental action. These authorities are particularly instructive in assessing the legality of the Minister’s demolition directives.

4.1 Military Governor of Lagos State v. Chief Emeka Odumegwu Ojukwu (1986) 1 NWLR (Pt. 18) 621

The locus classicus remains Military Governor of Lagos State v. Chief Emeka Odumegwu Ojukwu (1986) 1 NWLR (Pt. 18) 621. In that case, the Supreme Court condemned the government’s resort to self-help in seeking to regain possession of property from Ojukwu. Justice O. Obaseki, JSC (as he then was) famously declared that resort to self-help could lead to a breach of the peace and was “condemnable.” The Court held that even the State must submit to the judicial process and cannot take the law into its own hands.

The Supreme Court’s reasoning in Ojukwu’s case is particularly instructive. The Court observed that “the essence of rule of law is that it should never operate under the rule of force or fear. To use force, seek the court’s equity, is an attempt to infuse timidity into court and operate a sabotage of cherished rule of law. It must never be!” .

This principle is sometimes paraphrased as “the government must not be seen as a lawbreaker” . In a recent statement, human rights lawyer Femi Falana (SAN) described the Ojukwu case as establishing “a precedent against disregard for due process and the rule of law,” noting that “notwithstanding that the country was then under a military junta, the Supreme Court deprecated the action of the Lagos State Government in defying a court order and resorting to self-help” .

4.2 Osho v. Foreign Finance Corporation (1991) 5 SC 59

This principle was reinforced in Osho v. Foreign Finance Corporation (1991) 5 SC 59, where the Supreme Court affirmed the necessity of due process and fair hearing where governmental action affects rights in land. The Court held that a party whose property has been demolished without due process is entitled to redress, including damages for trespass. In Osho’s case, the Lagos State Development and Property Corporation (LSDPC) had demolished the plaintiff’s building without following the prescribed procedures. The Supreme Court awarded substantial damages, demonstrating that the courts will not hesitate to hold the State accountable for procedural breaches.

4.3 Galadima Giwa & 19 Ors v. FCT Minister & 6 Ors (unreported, FCT High Court)

More recently, in Galadima Giwa & 19 Ors v. FCT Minister & 6 Ors (unreported, FCT High Court), the court emphasised strict compliance with the statutory demolition procedure under sections 47, 48, 49, 50, 61 and 62 of the Urban and Regional Planning Act. The court reiterated that the Minister cannot bypass statutory safeguards or determine disputed proprietary rights as though he were a court.

4.4 Other Relevant Nigerian Authorities

In Chidi v. Attorney-General of the Federation (2007) 14 NWLR (Pt. 1055) 1, the Court of Appeal held that demolition of property without serving the requisite notice and affording the owner a hearing violates the right to fair hearing guaranteed by Section 36 of the Constitution. The Court emphasised that “the right to own property is a fundamental right which cannot be taken away except in accordance with the law.”

Similarly, in Adeogun v. Fashogbon (2008) 11 NWLR (Pt. 1098) 379, the Court of Appeal held that even where a building is erected on government land or in contravention of planning regulations, the owner is entitled to fair hearing before the building is demolished.

5. English Authorities: The Common Law Heritage

The Nigerian position draws sustenance from the English common law tradition, which has long recognised the principle that statutory powers must be exercised reasonably and in good faith.

5.1 Padfield v. Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food [1968] AC 997

In Padfield v. Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food [1968] AC 997, the House of Lords held that the Minister’s discretion under a statutory provision was not unfettered and could be challenged if exercised improperly. Lord Reid stated that “the Minister is not entitled to act in a manner which frustrates the policy of the Act.” This principle, that ministerial discretion must be exercised to promote the policy and objects of the Act—is directly relevant to the Minister’s powers under the Urban and Regional Planning Act.

5.2 Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd v. Wednesbury Corporation [1948] 1 KB 223

Similarly, in Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd v. Wednesbury Corporation [1948] 1 KB 223, the Court of Appeal established the famous “Wednesbury unreasonableness” test, holding that a decision by a public authority could be struck down if it was so unreasonable that no reasonable authority could have made it. While Nigerian courts have developed their own jurisprudence on unreasonableness, the principle that public authorities must act within the bounds of reasonableness applies with equal force.

5.3 Ridge v. Baldwin [1964] AC 40

In Ridge v. Baldwin [1964] AC 40, the House of Lords held that an administrative decision affecting the rights of an individual must be taken in accordance with the rules of natural justice, including the right to be heard. This principle, which has been adopted in Nigerian jurisprudence, reinforces the requirement that the Minister must afford affected property owners a hearing before ordering demolition.

5.4 Council of Civil Service Unions v. Minister for the Civil Service [1985] AC 374 (the GCHQ Case)

In this landmark case, Lord Diplock identified “procedural impropriety” as a ground for judicial review, including the failure to observe the rules of natural justice. This authority is particularly relevant where the Minister fails to serve notices or afford hearings as required by the Urban and Regional Planning Act.

6. The Abuja Flooding Context: A Critical Perspective

The recent flooding in Abuja has exposed the consequences of years of unregulated development . The Minister himself acknowledged that “people have blocked channels where, in the Master Plan, that is the right-of-way where water is supposed to be channelled” . He noted that “all those built-up areas that were not supposed to be built up, not a single poor person will live there. Those houses are houses built by well-to-do Nigerians” .

The Minister also stated that “those houses are not houses that were built last week. Those houses have been there 10 years ago, eight years ago” . This raises a critical question: if these structures have existed for a decade or more, why were they not addressed earlier? The Minister suggested that “previous administrations may not have had the political will” to enforce the regulations, and that “officers of government may not have been encouraged to do what they’re supposed to do” .

While the Minister’s determination to enforce planning regulations is commendable, the legal question remains whether the urgency of the flooding crisis justifies a departure from the statutory procedures prescribed by law. The answer, in my view, is a qualified no. The Supreme Court in Ojukwu’s case made it clear that even in circumstances of urgency, the government must act in accordance with the law. Where a structure poses an imminent danger to life, the law itself provides an exception—Section 62 permits demolition without prior notice where a building is in a “ruinous state” or constitutes an “imminent danger” to life. However, the Minister must be able to demonstrate that the statutory conditions for the exercise of that power have been satisfied. He cannot simply declare that all buildings on waterways pose an imminent danger and thereby bypass the procedural requirements of the Act.

7. The Correct Legal Position: A Synthesis

From the foregoing analysis, the correct legal position may be stated as follows:

7.1 Prior Court Order Not Invariably Required

First, a prior court order is not invariably required before a building in the FCT may be demolished. The Urban and Regional Planning Act confers statutory enforcement and demolition powers on the planning authorities, particularly under sections 60 to 62, subject to the prescribed notices and procedures. Where the Authority has complied with the statutory preconditions—including issuing an enforcement notice, affording the owner an opportunity to be heard, and allowing the prescribed period for compliance—it may proceed with demolition without a prior court order.

7.2 Statutory Powers, Not Personal Prerogatives

Second, such powers are statutory, not personal or arbitrary powers of the Minister. The Minister cannot arrogate to himself judicial powers or determine disputed proprietary rights as though he were a court. Where there is a genuine dispute as to title, ownership, or the legality of the structure, the proper course is to allow the courts to resolve the dispute before proceeding with demolition. To do otherwise would be to engage in the very executive self-help that the Supreme Court condemned in Ojukwu’s case.

7.3 Procedural Compliance Is Substantive, Not Merely Technical

Third, the statutory procedures are not mere formalities; they are substantive rights that must be strictly observed. The requirement to serve notice, to afford a hearing, and to allow a right of appeal are constitutionally protected rights under Sections 36 and 44 of the 1999 Constitution. Any breach of these procedures may render the demolition unconstitutional and expose the authority to liability in damages. In Osho v. Foreign Finance Corporation (supra), the Supreme Court awarded substantial damages against the government for demolishing property without due process.

7.4 Reasonableness and Good Faith

Fourth, the discretion conferred by statute must be exercised reasonably and in good faith. The Wednesbury principle, though English in origin, reflects a universal judicial approach to administrative action: a public officer must not act capriciously, vindictively, or arbitrarily. The Minister’s discretion is therefore “fetterable” in the sense that it must be exercised within the boundaries prescribed by law.

7.5 Executive Fiat Is Unacceptable

Finally, the Minister may exercise a lawful statutory demolition power without first obtaining a court order in every case, but he cannot exercise it merely by executive fiat. The power must be traceable to statutory authority and exercised consistently with Sections 36 and 44 of the 1999 Constitution and the rule of law. The Minister must be able to point to the statutory provision that authorises the particular demolition, and must demonstrate compliance with the procedural requirements of that provision.

8. The Flooding Crisis and the Public Interest Defence

It must be acknowledged that the flooding crisis presents a compelling public interest justification for urgent action. The Minister has correctly identified that buildings constructed on waterways contribute significantly to flooding, endangering lives and property . The public interest in preventing loss of life and property damage is substantial.

However, the public interest does not suspend the operation of the law. The Supreme Court in Ojukwu’s case made it clear that even where the government has a compelling interest in taking action, it must do so in accordance with the law. The Court stated that “the essence of rule of law is that it should never operate under the rule of force or fear” .

The proper approach is to invoke the statutory procedures with appropriate urgency. Where a structure poses an imminent danger to life, Section 62 of the Urban and Regional Planning Act permits demolition without prior notice. Where the danger is less immediate, the Authority must serve notice and afford an opportunity to be heard. In all cases, Section 80 requires that alternative accommodation or compensation be provided where persons are likely to be displaced .

It is also important to note that the Minister himself acknowledged the need for enforcement to be pursued “in line with the law” . In a statement on 17 August 2026, he stated: “We have to enforce the law. We need to ensure that what is supposed to be done is done in line with the law. Nobody’s property will be demolished, not even if it is owned by a senator, if it is not lawful” . This statement, while reassuring, must be backed by demonstrable compliance with the statutory and constitutional procedures.

9. Recommendations

Based on the foregoing analysis, the following recommendations are made:

9.1 For the FCT Administration

1. Conduct a Comprehensive Audit: Before embarking on any demolition exercise, the FCT Administration should conduct a comprehensive audit of all structures on waterways, identifying those that were approved, those that were constructed without approval, and those that predate the relevant planning regulations. This audit should be made public to ensure transparency.
2. Issue Proper Notices: In respect of structures that do not pose an imminent danger to life, the Authority must serve enforcement notices under Section 60 of the Urban and Regional Planning Act, affording owners the opportunity to be heard and to comply with the notices within the prescribed period.
3. Afford Fair Hearing: Where there is a dispute as to whether a structure constitutes a danger or whether it was lawfully constructed, the Authority must afford the owner a fair hearing before proceeding with demolition.
4. Provide Alternative Accommodation or Compensation: Where demolition will result in displacement, the Authority must comply with Section 80 and provide alternative accommodation or compensation.
5. Comply with Court Orders: Where a court has made an order restraining demolition, the Authority must comply with such order and seek to have it set aside through the judicial process, not by resorting to self-help.

9.2 For Property Owners and Occupiers

1. Seek Legal Advice: Property owners whose buildings are at risk should seek immediate legal advice to understand their rights and the available remedies.
2. Respond to Notices: Where notices are served, owners should respond promptly and provide any evidence that supports the legality of their structures.
3. Seek Judicial Intervention: Where the FCT Administration threatens to demolish without following the prescribed procedures, owners should not hesitate to seek judicial intervention through applications for injunctive relief and, where appropriate, judicial review.
4. Document Everything: Owners should keep detailed records of all communications with the FCT Administration, including notices served, correspondence, and photographs of their properties.
5. Conclusion

The Minister’s determination to address the flooding crisis in Abuja is understandable and, in principle, commendable. The recent flooding has exposed the consequences of years of unregulated development and the failure of previous administrations to enforce planning regulations. However, the proper response to this crisis must be anchored in the rule of law, not executive fiat.

The correct legal position is that the Minister may exercise lawful statutory demolition powers without first obtaining a court order in every case, but he cannot exercise such powers arbitrarily, disregard statutory procedures, or determine disputed proprietary rights as though he were a court. The statutory procedures—including the service of notices, the right to be heard, and the right of appeal—are not mere formalities; they are substantive rights protected by the Constitution.

The flooding crisis does not suspend the operation of the law. Rather, it calls for the law to be applied with appropriate urgency and in accordance with its provisions. The Minister must be able to point to the statutory provision that authorises the particular demolition, must demonstrate compliance with the procedural requirements of that provision, and must ensure that affected persons are afforded their constitutional rights.

As the Supreme Court held in Ojukwu’s case, the State cannot be a lawbreaker. The rule of law demands that even in times of crisis, the government must act within the boundaries prescribed by law. The Minister’s discretion is therefore “fetterable” in the sense that it must be exercised reasonably, fairly, and in accordance with the law. Any action that falls short of this standard will be subject to judicial scrutiny and may expose the government to liability in damages.

In the final analysis, the test of any government’s commitment to the rule of law is not how it acts when it is easy to do so, but how it acts when it is confronted with difficult challenges. The Abuja flooding crisis presents such a challenge. The manner in which the FCT Administration responds to this challenge will be a testament to its respect for the Constitution, the rule of law, and the fundamental rights of all citizens—whether they are senators, “big men,” or ordinary Nigerians.

References

Nigerian Statutes

1. Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended), Sections 36, 44
2. Nigerian Urban and Regional Planning Act, 1992, Sections 60, 61, 62
3. Kaduna State Urban and Regional Planning Law, 2018, Sections 60, 62, 80

Nigerian Case Law

1. Military Governor of Lagos State v. Chief Emeka Odumegwu Ojukwu (1986) 1 NWLR (Pt. 18) 621
2. Osho v. Foreign Finance Corporation (1991) 5 SC 59
3. Galadima Giwa & 19 Ors v. FCT Minister & 6 Ors (unreported, FCT High Court)
4. Council of the University of Ibadan v. Adamolekun (1967) 1 All NLR 213
5. Garba v. University of Maiduguri (1986) 1 NWLR (Pt. 18) 550
6. Odukwe v. Ogunbiyi (1998) 8 NWLR (Pt. 561) 339
7. A.G. Bendel State v. Aideyan (1989) 4 NWLR (Pt. 118) 646
8. Chidi v. Attorney-General of the Federation (2007) 14 NWLR (Pt. 1055) 1
9. Adeogun v. Fashogbon (2008) 11 NWLR (Pt. 1098) 379

English Case Law

1. Padfield v. Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food [1968] AC 997
2. Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd v. Wednesbury Corporation [1948] 1 KB 223
3. Ridge v. Baldwin [1964] AC 40
4. Council of Civil Service Unions v. Minister for the Civil Service [1985] AC 374

Newspaper and Online Sources

1. Ogunyinka, Sunday. “Abuja Flood: Wike Orders Demolition of Houses on Waterways.” Vanguard, 17 August 2026
2. “Wike Vows to Demolish Houses of ‘Senators, Big Men’ Blocking Abuja Waterways.” Premium Times, 17 August 2026
3. “Flooding in FCT: Wike Inspects Affected Areas in Maitama.” The Guardian, 17 August 2026
4. “FCT Minister Wike Declares: ‘No Property on Waterways Will Be Spared’.” Daily Trust, 17 August 2026

Charles Ude, Esq. is a legal practitioner and author based in Abuja, Nigeria. He is the principal partner at CHARLES UDE & CO LAW PRACTICE.

CU August 2026