JONATHAN VS. TINUBU: A MACHIAVELLIAN EXAMINATION OF POWER IN THEIR FIRST TWO YEARS AS COMMANDERS-IN-CHIEF
A Study in Fear, Love, Strategy, and the Ruthless Mathematics of Survival
Introduction: Why Machiavelli Still Rules Politics
Niccolò Machiavelli, in The Prince, outlined the harsh but timeless laws of power. A ruler, he argued, survives not by nobility or goodwill but by force, cunning, perception and the ability to eliminate threats before they mature. To understand the contrasting political destinies of President Goodluck Jonathan (2010–2012) and President Bola Ahmed Tinubu (2023–2025), one must interpret their first two years through Machiavelli’s framework. This is not about moral comparison but about strategic competence—how each leader rose to power, wielded fear, managed enemies, shaped narratives and secured or lost the machinery of the state. Nigerian newspapers, security reports, and archived political analyses provide the evidence for this evaluation, from The Guardian’s 2011 coverage of Jonathan’s rising insecurity challenges (https://guardian.ng) to Premium Times’s reports on Tinubu’s early sweeping decisions in 2023 (https://premiumtimesng.com).
Jonathan’s Rise: Fortune Without Fortification
Jonathan’s ascent to the presidency was almost accidental. He became Acting President through the 2010 “Doctrine of Necessity,” as widely reported by Vanguard Newspaper at the time (https://vanguardngr.com/2010/02/doctrine-of-necessity). Yar’Adua’s death elevated him to the full presidency, and his 2011 election was driven largely by national sympathy, not political engineering. Machiavelli warns that princes who rise by fortune rather than virtù must immediately consolidate force or be destroyed by circumstances. Jonathan never gained full control of the PDP governors, the northern military establishment, or the bureaucratic elite. The Daily Trust archives (https://dailytrust.com) show repeated reports between 2010 and 2012 of disagreements between Jonathan’s presidency and key northern power blocs.
Machiavelli’s analysis is clear: rulers who rise by chance must act with severity to secure the throne. Jonathan instead sought consensus in a battlefield of wolves.
Tinubu’s Rise: Political Virtù and Calculated Inheritance of Power
Tinubu’s ascent, documented extensively by The Nation Newspaper over two decades (https://thenationonlineng.net), was built on strategy, negotiation, capture of political structures, and long-term alliance formation. He constructed a nationwide political machine, captured the APC, weathered internal betrayals, and deployed immense calculation to emerge as president in 2023. According to Machiavelli, this is virtù—the disciplined, ruthless pursuit of power. Unlike Jonathan, Tinubu stepped into office not as a learner but as a practiced operator. He understood the mechanics of elite loyalty, institutional control, and the pricing of political obedience.
Machiavelli would argue that Tinubu arrived prepared, whereas Jonathan arrived exposed.
Fear, Love, and the Psychology of Rule
Machiavelli’s most famous line—“It is better to be feared than loved, if you cannot be both”—describes the sharpest contrast between these two presidents. Jonathan, as seen in his many public statements between 2010 and 2012, adopted a governance style rooted in gentleness. ThisDay Newspaper archives (https://thisdaylive.com) reveal repeated appeals for “dialogue,” “understanding,” and “patience.” The result was a perception of softness, especially as Boko Haram bombings escalated from Maiduguri to Abuja.
Tinubu, on the other hand, engineered fear on Day One with the instantaneous removal of fuel subsidy—an act of shock governance that dominated headlines in Premium Times on May 29, 2023 (https://premiumtimesng.com/politics). In his first months, he decapitated the financial and security networks of perceived opponents, suspended and detained Godwin Emefiele, restructured the DSS’s authority, and removed layers of bureaucrats. Whether approved or condemned, these actions created the fear that Machiavelli considers essential for control.
Eliminating Enemies: Wounding vs. Finishing
Machiavelli warns that a weak prince “wounds enemies but does not kill them.” Jonathan’s early years illustrate this perfectly. Boko Haram was neither fully crushed nor fully engaged; rebels gained territory while government responses wavered. Sahara Reporters and BBC Africa consistently reported the group’s growing boldness between 2011 and 2012 (https://bbc.com/africa). Politically, Jonathan allowed the New PDP rebellion to form under Amaechi, Tambuwal’s defection went unchallenged, and APC emerged as a formidable coalition.
Tinubu’s method is the opposite. He neutralizes opponents fully—through judicial maneuvers, strategic arrests, elite co-optation, intelligence infiltration, and rapid federal interventions. His purge of hostile elements in agencies was widely covered by Channels TV (https://channelstv.com). Machiavelli would call this “cleansing the court”, an essential requirement for survival in unstable nations.
Controlling Perception: Jonathan’s Lost Narrative vs. Tinubu’s Narrative Discipline
Jonathan struggled to control Nigeria’s public narrative. The 2012 fuel subsidy protests, widely documented by Punch Newspaper (https://punchng.com), cast his administration as insensitive. The string of Boko Haram bombings, including the 2011 UN Abuja attack, hardened the perception of weakness. Machiavelli insists that “appearances are everything,” and Jonathan ceded this ground.
Tinubu, conversely, maintains a disciplined propaganda ecosystem. Whether through orchestrated elite defenses, heavy media presence, or interpretive framing of policy, he manages perception aggressively. The Nation, TV Continental, and dozens of surrogates create a continuous environment of narrative control. Even hardships are framed as “painful but necessary reform”—a classic Machiavellian technique.
The Machiavellian Test: Who Is Easier to Unseat?
Based strictly on Machiavelli’s principles and on documented actions reported by Nigerian and global media, Jonathan was easier to unseat because he governed with goodness rather than guile, with love rather than fear, and with hesitation where decisiveness was needed.
Tinubu, whether praised or condemned, is structured for survival—controlling elite networks, crushing threats early, owning the narrative, and projecting inevitability.
In Machiavelli’s lens, Jonathan governed as a moral man in an immoral environment; Tinubu governs as a strategist in a brutal environment. Machiavelli would predict Jonathan’s fall—and Tinubu’s difficulty to overthrow.
Conclusion: The Prince’s Final Judgment
If Machiavelli were alive today, he would classify Tinubu as a prince governed by virtù—strategic cruelty, cunning manipulation, early consolidation, and a strategic blend of fear and tolerance. Jonathan, in contrast, would be the prototype of a prince elevated by fortune but insufficiently brutal to retain the crown. This comparison is not about goodness or evil; it is about capacity for survival in the political jungle. In Machiavelli’s world—and indeed in Nigeria’s—power respects strategy, not sentiment.
AProf Chukwuemeka Ifegwu Eke
