Nigeria’s Coalition Experiments: A Tumultuous Dance of Power and Fragmentation
The First Republic: A House Divided
Nigeria’s inaugural attempt at coalition-building during the First Republic (1963–1966) epitomized the perils of regionalism. The United Progressive Grand Alliance (UPGA), a pact between the Eastern-led NCNC and Western-centric Action Group, sought to counterbalance the Northern People’s Congress (NPC). Yet, ethnic loyalties proved insurmountable. The 1964 elections, marred by boycotts and violence, entrenched NPC dominance, exposing UPGA’s inability to transcend regional fissures. This failure catalyzed military intervention in 1966, abruptly ending Nigeria’s nascent democracy. The episode underscored a grim reality: coalitions lacking ideological glue would crumble under the weight of ethno-geographic rivalries.
The Second Republic: A Symphony of Disarray
By the Second Republic (1979–1983), opposition parties again rallied under the Progressive Parties Alliance (PPA) to challenge Shehu Shagari’s NPN. However, internal discord—exemplified by competing presidential bids from Obafemi Awolowo (UPN) and Nnamdi Azikiwe (NPP)—fractured the coalition. The NPN, wielding state resources and patronage, clinched a contentious victory in 1983, securing 47% of votes amid economic collapse and public disillusionment. When the military toppled Shagari months later, it underscored a recurring theme: fragmented oppositions inadvertently legitimize authoritarian resets.
The Fourth Republic: From PDP Hegemony to the APC Watershed
The return to democracy in 1999 ushered in the People’s Democratic Party (PDP)’s 16-year dominance, a period marked by opposition impotence. Loose alliances like the 2003 ANPP-AD coalition floundered against the PDP’s electoral machinery, which manipulated institutions like INEC. The 2015 election, however, rewrote the script. The All Progressives Congress (APC)—a merger of ACN, CPC, ANPP, and APGA—harnessed national discontent over Boko Haram’s insurgency and economic malaise to oust Goodluck Jonathan. Buhari’s victory, Nigeria’s first democratic power transfer, revealed a tantalizing truth: structured mergers, not ad hoc alliances, could dismantle incumbency.
The Post-2015 Paradox: Fragmentation Redux
Yet, the APC’s triumph proved ephemeral. By 2019, the party had morphed into the new hegemon, while opposition forces regressed into familiar disarray. The PDP’s Atiku Abubakar and Labour Party’s Peter Obi split the anti-APC vote in 2023, enabling Bola Tinubu’s narrow win with just 36.6% support. Judicial rulings dismissing electoral challenges further entrenched public cynicism. This era mirrors a Sisyphean cycle: coalitions rise, only to fracture once power is attained, their unity sacrificed at the altar of personal ambition and ethno-religious calculus.
Coalitions in Nigeria: Lessons from the Crucible
Nigeria’s history of anti-incumbency alliances reveals a stark dichotomy. Success demands ideological cohesion, as seen in the APC’s 2015 merger, while failure often stems from transactional pragmatism and ethno-regional myopia. Incumbents retain potent advantages—control over security, finances, and electoral infrastructure—yet socio-economic crises (like the 1983 austerity or 2015 recession) remain wildcards, galvanizing dissent. Ultimately, Nigeria’s coalition politics reflect a nation perpetually grappling with its pluralism: a dance between democratic aspiration and the gravitational pull of fragmentation.
Dr Chukwuemeka Ifegwu Eke writes from Yakubu Gowon University Nigeria
