States of Emergency in Nigeria: A Historical and Academic Assessment
On March 20, 2025, the Senate approved a state of emergency in Rivers State, following a similar move by the House of Representatives. This development has sparked intense debate and discussion. In this article, we aim to provide a brief historical context of states of emergency declared by civilian governments in Nigeria, while conducting a dispassionate and academic assessment of this phenomenon, devoid of political bias.
The History of State of Emergency in Nigeria Under Civilian Governments: Distilling Good Intentions
Since Nigeria’s transition to civilian governance in 1999, the declaration of states of emergency has been a rare but contentious tool wielded by federal administrations to address existential threats to public order. While these measures are constitutionally permissible under Section 305 of the 1999 Constitution, their application by democratically elected leaders has often sparked debates about federal overreach, political motivations, and the delicate balance between security and democratic accountability. Civilian presidents have consistently framed these declarations as necessary interventions to stabilize crises, protect lives, and preserve national unity. For instance, in 2004, President Olusegun Obasanjo invoked emergency powers in Plateau State following a surge in ethno-religious violence in Jos, which claimed thousands of lives. By suspending Governor Joshua Dariye and installing a military administrator, the federal government aimed to disarm militias, restore peace, and foster reconciliation between warring communities. Though criticized for undermining the principles of federalism, the move was defended as a temporary measure to prevent further bloodshed. Similarly, in 2013, President Goodluck Jonathan declared a state of emergency across Borno, Yobe, and Adamawa states as Boko Haram militants seized territory and terrorized civilians. Unlike earlier precedents, elected governors retained nominal authority while military operations intensified. The administration argued that this hybrid approach balanced constitutional propriety with the urgency of combating terrorism, though critics highlighted the prolonged militarization of civilian spaces and the failure to fully dismantle the insurgency. These examples underscore a recurring tension: while civilian governments have often acted with ostensibly noble intentions—halting violence, safeguarding democracy, or protecting citizens—the outcomes have frequently exposed vulnerabilities in Nigeria’s federal structure, raising questions about the politicization of emergency powers and their long-term impact on governance.
Rivers State: A Microcosm of Federal Coercion and Political Volatility
Rivers State, Nigeria’s economic linchpin as the heart of its oil-producing Niger Delta, has long been a battleground for political and economic control between state elites and federal authorities. Rather than formal states of emergency, federal coercion here has manifested through subtler, yet equally impactful, tactics such as financial strangulation, judicial interference, and the weaponization of security agencies. A defining example unfolded during the tenure of Governor Rotimi Amaechi (2007–2015), whose clashes with the Jonathan administration over oil revenue allocation and intra-party PDP rivalries led to federal withholding of state funds and the controversial deployment of police to blockade the state assembly. Though framed as efforts to “restore order,” these actions were widely interpreted as punitive measures to weaken Amaechi’s opposition to federal policies. Similarly, under Governor Nyesom Wike (2015–2023), tensions with the Buhari-led APC government saw federal anti-corruption agencies target Wike’s allies, while the governor accused Abuja of sabotaging state projects and stoking insecurity. These conflicts highlight a pattern where federal authorities leverage constitutional and institutional tools to subdue politically adversarial states, blurring the lines between lawful governance and partisan coercion. Rivers’ instability thus epitomizes a broader national dilemma: the exploitation of centralized power to undermine subnational autonomy, often under the guise of maintaining national unity or combating corruption.
National Coercion: Centralization and the Erosion of Federalism
Nigeria’s federal system, in practice, operates with a heavily centralized presidency that wields disproportionate influence over states, enabling coercive strategies that extend beyond formal emergency declarations. Key mechanisms include the control of oil revenues through the Federation Account, the deployment of federal security forces to suppress dissent, and the selective use of anti-graft agencies to target political opponents. For example, the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) has frequently been accused of focusing disproportionately on opposition figures, while turning a blind eye to allies of sitting presidents. This centralization is rooted in historical legacies of military rule, which concentrated power in Abuja and left civilian administrations with tools better suited to autocracy than democracy. The 2013 state of emergency in the northeast, for instance, avoided the outright removal of governors—a concession to political optics—but still reinforced the presidency’s dominance over security policy. Conversely, Obasanjo’s 2006 emergency in Ekiti State, which dissolved the legislature amid impeachment chaos, was perceived as a partisan maneuver to install a pliant administrator. Such actions reflect a systemic imbalance where the federal government functions as both arbiter and participant in state-level disputes, eroding trust in institutions and deepening regional grievances. Over time, this dynamic risks entrenching a cycle of coercion and resistance, further fragmenting Nigeria’s already fragile national cohesion.
Conclusion: Intentions vs. Realities in Nigerian Federalism
The invocation of emergency powers and federal coercion by Nigeria’s civilian governments reveals a paradox: interventions justified as stabilizing measures often exacerbate the very crises they aim to resolve. While presidents have articulated legitimate concerns—from curbing violence to preserving constitutional order—the historical record shows a propensity to exploit these tools for political consolidation. Rivers State’s struggles illustrate how informal coercion can destabilize governance as effectively as formal emergencies, particularly in resource-rich regions where economic and political stakes are high. For Nigeria to reconcile its centralized instincts with its federal ideals, reforms must prioritize equitable resource distribution, depoliticized security institutions, and clearer constitutional safeguards against executive overreach. Without such measures, the gap between the stated intentions of federal interventions and their corrosive outcomes will continue to undermine Nigeria’s democratic project.
Dr Chukwuemeka Ifegwu Eke writes from Yakubu Gowon University Nigeria
